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I have known Bob Mundheim for thirty years. I tried to recruit
him into our law firm at least twice. We have served together on the
Council of the American Law Institute and have rarely disagreed.
But I came to value him most during the last fifteen months of the
Carter Administration, when he was General Counsel of the Treasury Department and I was Counsel to the President.
About a month after I went to work for President Carter, our
hostages were seized at the United States Embassy in Teheran. Six
weeks later, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. For the balance of
President Carter's term, Bob and I spent most of our time on the
legal and economic countermeasures taken to deal with these twin
crises. We worked together on the freeze of Iranian assets in
November 1979, the grain and other economic boycotts imposed on
the Soviet Union in January 1980, and the partly successful effort to
persuade the United States Olympic team and those of other nations
not to take part in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.
But our closest collaboration of all was in the December 1980January 1981 negotiations to unthaw the Iranian asset freeze in
return for the simultaneous release of all our hostages.
To accomplish that Herculean task, President Carter selected a
small team headed by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher
and including Bob and me. Because of the time pressures created by
the rapidly approaching transfer of power to President-elect Reagan,
we had the rare privilege of bypassing the usual bureaucratic checks
and balances. So that we could reach decisions and act on them in
time to be relevant, the President had us report directly to him. He
wanted players willing to make up their minds and stick out their
necks. Bob Mundheim fit that bill to perfection.
When we embarked on this project, I thought the odds against
succeeding were at least ten to one. On the night ofJanuary 19-20,
just a few hours before President Reagan was to take the oath of
office, I thought the odds against us were still at least three to one.
That we overcame these odds was due in large part to Bob's unique
skills as a financial lawyer.
t Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.
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Consider the complexities of our task. We were negotiating the
return of some twelve billion dollars of Iranian deposits in the
domestic and foreign branches of some sixteen major United States
commercial banks, and of Iran's deposits of cash, gold bars, and
United States government securities with the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. Because of the turmoil of their revolution, the Iranians
did not have records showing the amount of their net principal balances with each bank, and had not agreed with the banks on the
interest rates to be accrued after the date of the freeze. The transaction had to be accomplished with the cooperation of four central
banks (the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Algerian Central Bank, and Iran's Bank Markazi). The transfers had to be coordinated so as to coincide with the simultaneous release of all our
hostages and their safe departure from Iranian territory and airspace.
Moreover, since no Iranian official would deal face-to-face with
any American official, we had to negotiate all of this through the
Algerians, whom the Iranians selected as their intermediaries. As a
result, we had to explain our American legal and technical problems
in French to Algerians brought up under the Napoleonic Code, and
they in turn had to explain Farsi to Iranians accustomed to Islamic
law and with little experience in complex transactions. The whole
process had to be repeated in reverse when the Iranians needed to
explain their positions to us. To reduce the transmission time of this
cumbersome process, Warren Christopher moved to Algeria for the
final ten days of the negotiations.
By the time the final negotiations began, Bob had left the Treasury, but his skills were so essential that Deputy Treasury Secretary
Robert Carswell drafted him back from private life. His main assignment was to deal with the four central banks, and to be the financial
lawyer on Christopher's team in Algiers. With Bob's critical help, we
arranged for the Bank of England to serve as the Escrow Agent for
the United States and for the Algerian Central Bank to serve as
Escrow Agent for Iran. Since there was not time to make a physical
transfer of the gold or the United States government securities, we
arranged for the Federal Reserve to transfer its gold bars and securities from the name of the Bank Markazi to the Bank of England, without physically moving the gold bars or securities from New York to
London, and for the Bank of England to put an equivalent amount of
its own gold bars and United States government securities in the
name of the Algerian Central Bank of the benefit of the Bank
Markazi. We arranged for the bank deposits to be electronically
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transferred from the commercial banks to the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York and from the New York Fed to the Bank of England for
the benefit of the Algerian Central Bank.
When the moment for transfer came during the night ofJanuary
19-20, all of these mechanical transactions were smoothly accomplished. But in the course of the night, we endured all the Perils of
Pauline. Unlike the practice in other huge financial transactions, we
had no time to rehearse the mechanics of an actual closing, and we
had to improvise as we went along. For example:
* The Federal Reserve Bank of New York did not have enough
cash to transfer to the Bank of England, and it had to arrange for a
midnight infusion of cash from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis.
* The standard full and complete release drafted by the United
States bank lawyers was unacceptable to the Bank Markazi, because
the Bank Markazi did not know whether the deposit, interest, and
loan set-off calculations used by the United States banks were accurate, and would not take their numbers on trust. On the night of
January 19, the Iranian Prime Minister denounced the American
bank lawyers over the radio for trying to trick Iran into signing away
its right to challenge the banks' figures. We had to make a go-no-go
decision on what form of a more open-ended release both the Iranians and the bank lawyers would swallow. If we guessed wrong, there
was no time to try something different. With the help of Bob and the
Bank Markazi's British solicitor, we worked out a draft that both
sides accepted.
* When the redrafted Iranian release and transfer instruction
finally came over the telex from Teheran to London, it began with
the wrong signature code number for the Bank Markazi, and it then
proceeded to make wild errors in the net balance for some of the
American banks. Although the correct signature code appeared at
the end of the message, the bank lawyers were reluctant to authorize
the transfers until the wrong net balance figures were corrected.
There was no time to request and wait for a corrective long telex,
and there was no assurance that a "corrected" telex would itself be
free of errors. With the encouragement of a wholly unauthorized
"order" given on Bob Carswell's and my advice by the Secretary of
the Treasury, the bank lawyers cast their normal caution aside and
did their patriotic duty.
* Later that same night, Ernie Patrikis, the New York Fed's
lawyer on the Christopher team in Algiers, could not reach agreement on all the technical terms of the escrow arrangement between
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the Fed and the Algerian Central Bank. In Ernie's view, the Algerian
draft left the Fed unduly exposed under certain contingencies, with a
downside risk running into the billions. Ernie called Tony Solomon,
the New York Fed's President, through the open lines maintained by
the State Department's Operations Center. The Center's duty
officer monitored the call, and telephoned me in the Oval Office to
report it was going badly. He offered to patch me in, and President
Carter decided to get on the phone as well. Ernie was holding fast,
but the President and I persuaded Tony Solomon that other terms of
the overall agreement adequately covered the risks, and Tony
instructed Ernie to go along. If we had not persuaded Tony, we
would have faced the ultimate question of whether the President can
give orders to the Fed.
* The final agonizing countdown in Algiers began about four
A.M. Washington time on Inauguration Day. Before the Algerian
Central Bank could certify to Teheran that the quid pro quo for
releasing our hostages had been performed to the letter, officials of
the Bank of England and the Algerian Central Bank had to beancount all of the bank balances, gold bars, cash, and United States
securities that were being moved through their escrow accounts.
They took four hours to perform this bookkeeping task. About 6
A.M. President Carter got so impatient that he tried to telephone
Margaret Thatcher to seek her intervention, but he could not get
through. At last, shortly after 8 A.M. on January 20, the certification
was flashed from Algiers to Teheran.
* One final ironic note. Except for occasional catnaps, none of
us in Washington or Algiers, including President Carter, had been to
bed for forty-eight hours. At President Carter's instruction, I telephoned Blair House at 8:15 A.M. so that he could tell President-elect
Reagan that the deal was done. But I was told that the Governor was
still asleep and could not be awakened. (Before taking office, the
President-elect and his staff had disdained negotiating for the hostages' return. After he took over, however, President Reagan's
Administration came to support the final deal and vigorously conducted its successful defense before the Supreme Court.)
Bob Mundheim has recorded many achievements during his
brilliant career, and he will score many more before he hangs up his
tennis shoes. But to me his finest moments were as part of the team
that negotiated the return of our Iranian hostages on honorable and
advantageous terms in the most complex, delicate, and exciting
financial transactions of modern times.

